Research Proposal: American Failure in Counter-Insurgency (Coin) in Vietnam and Afghanistan

Chapter 1: Introduction

The United States of America has been involved in multiple confrontations on a counter-insurgency basis in foreign lands such as Vietnam and Afghanistan. Although the American military is arguably the leading counter-insurgency power around the globe, it has been characterized by multiple failures in its military history since the Vietnam War. More so, these failures have shed light on the inefficiency of American counter-insurgence techniques. Counter-insurgency can be considered a political pursuit in response to an insurgency through various means such[1]  as attrition. Attrition is arguably the oldest and most popular strategy for counter-insurgency involving direct attacks from one party to another with the aim of crippling enemy numbers, resources, and morale. Despite the inevitable use of attrition in any counter-insurgency and war, other models and doctrines of counter-insurgency and such political conflict have also been considered and esteemed over the decades such as the Weinberg and Powell doctrines. These models define the approach and thinking pattern used in counter-insurgency. However, various challenges exist to military reform and the use of other doctrines in direct conflict. Still, the lack of such doctrines and the use of the same counter-insurgency techniques has crippled America's efforts in global military missions. For example, despite the failure of the attrition strategy in the Vietnam War, the American military still approached the Afghanistan war with the same strategy. Hence, the strategy proved inefficient and incompetent in both cases, with the United States taking heavy losses. Therefore, it is fundamental to determine the causes of failure in American counter-insurgency through the Vietnam and Afghanistan Wars case studies and the use of similar methods in both wars despite their proven inefficiency. 

Background 

The American military has continuously used attrition strategies in multiple counter-insurgency missions throughout its history despite the constant inefficiencies. First, the Vietnam war, which occurred from 1955 to 1975, is highly characterized by poor performance by the military in its tactics which led to excess human costs incurred^[1]. [2] Despite lasting over twenty years, the war saw various inefficiencies in securing South Vietnam territory against communist influence and insurgents. Since President L. B. Johnson's directive to increase American military presence in the war in 1964, little progress was made as should have been, considering the continuous buildup of military forces against the conventional warfare posed by the Northern Vietnamese forces^[2]. [3] In this case, attrition strategies were used by which American and ARVN forces sought to deplete enemy forces, which, however, found support from other communist states such as the Soviet Union and China. A quote by Ho Chi Minh directly describes the situation, by which he stated that “if ten of our men are killed, one of yours is also, which will tier you faster than it will us.”^[3] However, a more positive change occurred when President Nixon directed the employment of the Vietnamization strategy, which mainly involved giving the Southern ARVN forces more control of the war and reducing American troops on the frontline. A significant result of this strategy was the defeat of the North's attack by the South's ARVN forces in 1972^[4]. [4] However, the war ended with total failure on the United States' part as a result of pulling back due to both internal and external reasons during the Nixon Presidency. The United States faced consequent human and financial costs, with little result to show[5]  for the war^[5]. [6] Therefore, despite the heavy investments made by the American military, the attrition strategy gave inefficient results compared to other strategies used during the war. 

On the other hand, the Afghanistan war is also heavily characterized by the attrition strategy, which further saw more inefficiency. During the Afghanistan war, which took place from 2001 to 2020 after the September 11 terrorist attacks, notable references such as the then Army General Stanley McChrystal disapproved of the tactics used during the counter-insurgency against Taliban forces^[6]. [7] More so, General McChrystal declared to conduct counter-insurgency together with socioeconomic reforms. Hence, a major strategy General McChrystal sought was the differentiation of enemy activities such [8] as those based on religious fanaticism and those based on genuine grievances like corruption and marginalization, by which the latter could be addressed through diplomacy. However, the Afghanistan war also followed suit with the Vietnamese war, using direct attrition methods which[9]  eventually failed to reduce enemy insurgency strength. Additionally, the Afghanistan war failed by increasing civilian casualties, creating resentment from the public towards the Americans, NATO, and the Afghanistan government's efforts against the Taliban^[7]. Although the Afghanistan counter-insurgency war was the most expensive, it faced difficulties in attaining its goals, causing less expected results^[8]. Therefore, attrition methods are still common as seen with their use in Afghanistan, causing more failures for the[10]  America in managing the insurgency.  

Research question 

Despite the continuous counter-insurgency results throughout American military history, the same strategies have still been used from the Vietnam War to the Afghanistan War. Therefore, a major study focus and research question exist as to why the US military still prioritized the attrition strategy for its early involvement in these wars despite contrary evidence, which saw both wars being lost. More definitive research questions for the proposal include:

1. Why did the United States employ the attrition strategy a second time in Afghanistan between 2001- 2015 despite the historical evidence that the strategy did not work against the insurgency in the Vietnam War between 1964-1969?

2.Why did the US ignore using the Weinberger and Powell Doctrine in Afghanista^]? 

Hypothesis & Justification of the study 

The underlying hypothesis of the study includes the essentiality of attrition strategies in counter-insurgency and the challenges in bringing on board other strategies. First, there is persistent maintenance of improper mechanisms in responding to insurgencies for the United States and other countries, which illustrates the lack of evolution in counter-insurgency. Secondly, there exist challenges faced in counter-insurgency in employing new doctrines despite their proven essentiality. Despite the failures of attrition strategies in the Vietnam and Afghanistan Wars, the strategy remains crucial for winning any counter-insurgency for any given war^[10]. However, tactics and models such as the Weinberg and Powell doctrines include a more strategic and informed approach to counter-insurgency, which includes war as the last option in fulfilling the necessary political needs of the United States.Therefore, some of the choices and turn of events leading to using the attrition method alone without fully adopting doctrines illustrated by Weinberg and Powell are necessary to determine. This study is fundamental in determining better ways of adopting these strategies and overcoming circumstantial and logistical challenges. Therefore, the study is justifiable in explaining American failure in counter-insurgency in applying these necessary strategies. 

Chapter 2: Literature review

Considering the rich American history in counter-insurgence, much literature and academic works have focused on the topic while citing the country's failures and reasons for failure in multiple counter-insurgent missions, such as in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. For example, multiple studies and reports describe the persistence of the counter-insurgency conflict response, which Western countries have long adhered to, citing its continual use in the significantly increasing number of counter-insurgency interventions by these countries, despite its continual failed reforms that only end up in more ethnic and communal division^[[11]  More research further illustrates some of the major problems that affected the Afghanistan War, which was a repeat of the counter-insurgence mistakes in the Vietnam War, such as the cyclic problem of bypassing local governments in both countries^[14]. Also, despite the fundamentality of using other strategies and doctrines, there remained a lack of proper mechanisms to employ these doctrines, such as in the Afghanistan War, where General McChrystal shifted goals to protect Afghanistan civilians^[15]. However, these mechanisms employed additional American forces instead of relying on domestic forces, which resulted in an inefficiency[12]  to uphold[13]  these goals. Other studies have also compared similarities between counter-insurgency in Vietnam and Afghanistan, which are highly similar in the wrong decisions and assumptions made by the United States, such as an overestimation of local governments in both countries^[16]. More questions have also been raised on counter-insurgency tactics, such as the manner which they should be conducted, their permanency in the American military and whether they are ethical^[17]. Hence, much literature review can be used to help answer the study's research questions and highlight challenges and mistakes facing American counter-insurgency. 

Chapter 3: Methodology

 In order to determine the reasons for the American military's use of conventional counter-insurgency, a thorough review of the choices and circumstances that led to its use [14] is done to inform the study. In this case, a most [15] different systems design (MDSD) methodology approach is used for both the Vietnam War and Afghanistan War case studies^[18]. This methodology design is geared to determine similar dependent variables in the [16] different cases and therefore identify the independent variable that brings about the general outcome of counter-insurgency failure. Also, such comparative political techniques define the cause and effect of the general outcome by determining these similar variables in both cases.

Independent and Dependent VariablesIn this case, some of the dependent and independent variables in both wars are observable. For example, the dependent variables include the American government's decision to use attrition strategies and other such mechanisms despite their proven failure. On the other hand, the independent variables mainly include the processes that led to the decision to use attrition strategies. These independent variables also include the individuals and institutions responsible for the decision to use attrition strategies at the beginning stages of both the Vietnam and Afghanistan Wars. Additionally, the objectives and political interests that commenced these processes are highlighted. Hence, data collection and analysis are geared to define these different variables through a qualitative approach. In this case, data collection is taken through a systematic literature review to identify these variables, especially independent variables that led to the decision to use attrition strategies. Therefore, through the most different system's design (MDSD) approach, a more thorough study is done to determine independent variables that cause multiple failures for American counter-insurgency.

Table 1: Possible Independent and Dependent Variables

4: Reasons for employing Counter-insurgency techniques “Attrition” in Vietnam and Afghanistan

The study will mainly determine the independent variables leading to attrition strategies and bypassing other strategies such as the Weinberg and Powell doctrines. Therefore, the reasons behind the decision to use attrition strategies build the core independent variables that further highlight the major causes of failure in counter-insurgency in both the Vietnam and Afghanistan Wars. These decisions include those made by senior government officials, government and military institutions. For example, one such independent variable is seen with General Westmoreland, the leading general during the initial stages of the American military's involvement in the Vietnam War. General Westmoreland adopted the attrition strategy in the belief of America's advancement in artillery and air power, unlike the former military culture for decisive and annihilative strokes^[19]. On the other hand, another scenario of an independent variable includes the Pentagon's reluctance to participate in nation-building during the start of the Afghanistan War. These portray some of the decisive factors that lead to the use of attrition strategies and the lack of use for others, such as the Weinberg and Powell doctrines. Hence, more analysis is done to determine independent variables from the two cases, sourced from the decisions of senior government officials, government, and military institutions, which resulted in the counter-insurgency outcome.

Chapter 5: US policy makers' decisions made in Vietnam and Afghanistan and their impact on American Military Leadership

More focus is given to the decisions made by policymakers and their effects on the war. Major decisions that engaged in attrition warfare include the choice to introduce and increase American troops in both wars. Examples in both wars include the introduction of U.S. and ally troops in Afghanistan resulting from the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the increase of military personnel by President Johnson, with the approval and direction of the U.S. Congress, resulting from the American loss of military instruments such as the U.S. destroyer Turner Joy^[20]. This also includes the circumstances that led to these decisions as part of the independent variables identified. Therefore, more analysis is given to determine the influence of policymakers and their decisions, both on the war and future military structures.

Chapter 6: Why were the Weinberger Doctrine and Powell Doctrine not adopted in Afghanistan?

Another major focus of the analysis is to determine the lack of employing other strategies such as the Weinberg doctrine and the Powell doctrine. The Weinberg-Powell Doctrines were established after the Vietnam War by both Powel and Weinberg, who served in the military's leadership and were sourced as lessons from the Vietnam War. The foundational concepts for these doctrines included using attrition strategies as a last resort, which would only be used if certain conditions were present and all non-violent strategies were inefficient^[21]. These conditions included formulating well-defined objectives and the need for a whole-hearted military response. Some of the reasons for the immediate need for attrition, with little consideration of these doctrines, include the American military struggle to compete with the local and unforeseeable guerrilla tactics used in Vietnam, which led to a direct response by the US military to reach a higher death count of enemy forces, compared to acquiring territory or using diplomatic strategies^[22]. Therefore, more analysis is necessary to determine the limited influence of the Weinberg and Powell doctrines.

Conclusion: Possible Outcomes and Contribution to Knowledge.

It is fundamental to determine the underlying factors that result in American counter-insurgency failure and the causes for the lack of employment of other strategic thinking such as the Weinberg and Powell doctrines. Counter-insurgencies have witnessed higher human and financial costs compared to the limited benefits and goals each mission has brought about. Therefore, despite the consistent results of counter-insurgency techniques such as attrition, it is imperative to determine the reasons behind the American military's use of these same techniques in recent counter-insurgency missions. A case study of the Vietnam and Afghanistan Wars is used to answer this research question. Therefore, this study has the potential to lay the groundwork for determining the lack of critical evolution in American military strategies. In addition, the research question can address better systems and doctrines deployable for future conflicts. These systems also include the mechanisms of achieving them due to possible challenges and early mistakes in responding to insurgencies. Hence, the study is necessary for the evolution of counter-insurgency techniques in the country and other Western states. 

Note: Kindly reassess the entirety of the paper and avoid wordiness. Check for missing punctuation as well. Thank you.

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[1] O’Hanlon, Michael. "America’s History of Counterinsurgency." https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_counterinsurgency_ohanlon.pdf