Hume On the Immateriality of The Soul

David Hume's treatise 1.4.5 on the soul's immateriality dispenses a significant reservation against the traditional illustration of the soul as an immaterial prospect distinct from the body and suggests that the mind should get comprehended as a conglomeration of perceptions and experiences attributed to the brain's activity. As such, Hume presents an argument manifesting no corroboration for the materialization of an immaterial soul and defines all mental states and activities as maxims that can get explicated in terms of the physical frameworks of the brain and the nervous system. The fundamental rationale underpinning the argument of Hume on the immateriality of the soul manifests by the philosopher's empiricist approach to knowledge, which reinforces the vitality of sensory experience in defining and devising a framework for our beliefs and consequent comprehension of the world (Hume, 1978). Based on the reservations of Hume, the ideas of the soul are not hinged on direct experience but instead based on abstract reasoning and philosophical speculation, which he defines as having no direct sensory evidence of the soul and that all incidents of mental states and activities are in proximity to humans' physical bodies. Equally significant, the philosopher's critique of the conventional view of the soul are founded on multifarious axioms and dynamics which reasserts his justifications for the soul's immortality. As such, Hume argues that the discernment of substance as traditionally comprehended is problematic as they usually get understood as distinct, independent prospects that materialize apart from their properties and qualities.